You moved your mail to a new provider months ago. Your DNS still publishes the old provider’s DKIM records, and a message signed with one of those keys still passes DKIM as your domain.

The short answer

Each DKIM key you publish at selector._domainkey.example.com validates mail signed for your domain with that selector [1]. Keys from an old provider keep working for whoever holds the private key. Check that the new provider signs, wait until your DMARC reports stop showing the old selector, then delete the old records or publish an empty p= [1][4].

What it looks like

Your MX and SPF records point at the new provider, and the old provider’s selectors are still in your zone. This domain moved from Microsoft 365 to Fastmail:

example.com.                       MX     10 in1-smtp.messagingengine.com.
example.com.                       MX     20 in2-smtp.messagingengine.com.
selector1._domainkey.example.com.  CNAME  selector1-example-com._domainkey.example.onmicrosoft.com.
selector2._domainkey.example.com.  CNAME  selector2-example-com._domainkey.example.onmicrosoft.com.
fm1._domainkey.example.com.        CNAME  fm1.example.com.dkim.fmhosted.com.
fm2._domainkey.example.com.        CNAME  fm2.example.com.dkim.fmhosted.com.
fm3._domainkey.example.com.        CNAME  fm3.example.com.dkim.fmhosted.com.

The MX hosts and the fm records follow Fastmail’s documentation [6]; the selector records follow Microsoft’s format for domains added before May 2025 [5]. The DKIM checker finds both sets of selectors and asks whether you still send through Microsoft 365. It asks because DNS shows the records and can’t show who still uses them.

Why an old key is a risk

A receiver verifies a signature with whatever key sits at the selector the signature names [1]. If the key validates and d= is your domain, the message passes DKIM, and that pass aligns with your From domain for DMARC [3]. A p=reject policy does not stop it.

The old provider still holds the private key, and anyone with access to your old account there can still send mail it signs. RFC 6376 describes this case: when an outsourcing contract ends, the domain revokes the key so that every message using that selector fails verification [1].

Find the selectors you still publish

  1. Open your DNS panel and list every record whose name ends in ._domainkey.
  2. Match each one to a provider by its name and target:
Provider Selectors What the record holds or points to
Microsoft 365, domains added before May 2025 selector1, selector2 CNAME to selector1-example-com._domainkey.example.onmicrosoft.com [5]
Microsoft 365, newer domains selector1, selector2 CNAME to selector1-example-com._domainkey.example.n-v1.dkim.mail.microsoft; the letter before -v1 varies [5]
Fastmail fm1, fm2, fm3; mesmtp on domains hosted there before 2018 CNAME to fm1.example.com.dkim.fmhosted.com [6]
Google Workspace google by default TXT with the key itself [7]
SendGrid, with automated security s1, s2 CNAME to s1.domainkey. followed by your account’s SendGrid host [8]
Cloudflare Email Routing cf2024-1 TXT with the key, added by Cloudflare [9]
  1. Confirm with your DMARC reports. RFC 9990 requires every DKIM result in an aggregate report to name its selector [4]. Before RFC 9990 it was not required, so reports from some receivers may still leave it out [4]. If the old selector still appears with a DKIM pass, something still signs with it. How to read a DMARC aggregate report shows where to look.

The DKIM record page explains selectors and the tags inside each key.

Remove them in this order

  1. Confirm the new provider signs. Send yourself a message and open its headers. The DKIM-Signature header should show d=example.com and the new provider’s selector in s= [1].
  2. Wait until the old selector drops out of your reports. Give it at least one full cycle of your slowest regular sender, such as a month for monthly invoices.
  3. Delete the old records, or revoke them. For receivers the two are the same: RFC 6376 defines no difference between a revoked key and a removed one [1]. To revoke a key, publish its record with an empty p= [1]:
selector1._domainkey.example.com.  TXT  "v=DKIM1; p="
  1. Remove your domain from the old provider’s account, so nothing there keeps signing for it.

You can’t revoke a key that sits behind a CNAME from your side, because the key lives at the provider. Delete the CNAME, or replace it with the TXT record above. A name that holds a CNAME can hold no other record, so remove the CNAME before you add the TXT [2].

After the cleanup, only the new provider’s selectors remain:

fm1._domainkey.example.com.  CNAME  fm1.example.com.dkim.fmhosted.com.
fm2._domainkey.example.com.  CNAME  fm2.example.com.dkim.fmhosted.com.
fm3._domainkey.example.com.  CNAME  fm3.example.com.dkim.fmhosted.com.

If you are still in the middle of the move, Change email provider without losing a single message covers the order of the MX, SPF and DKIM changes. Leaving Cloudflare Email Routing works differently: disabling it deletes the MX, SPF and DKIM records it added [9], as Cloudflare Email Routing explains.

Dangling DKIM CNAME records

A dangling CNAME is a selector that points at a name with no key behind it. A receiver that follows it finds nothing, and a signature that uses that selector fails with “no key for signature” [1]. In dig, the query returns NXDOMAIN together with your CNAME (output shortened):

$ dig TXT selector1._domainkey.example.com
;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NXDOMAIN
selector1._domainkey.example.com. 3600 IN CNAME selector1-example-com._domainkey.example.onmicrosoft.com.

It breaks nothing today. The checker still flags it, because the record keeps a name in your domain pointing into a zone the old provider runs. DNS resolvers follow a CNAME wherever it points [2], so if a key appears at that target again, it validates mail for your domain.

One pattern is normal. Microsoft 365 publishes two selectors and keeps only one active; the other is used after the next key rotation [5]. The inactive one can point at a name with no key: on 18 November 2026, Microsoft’s own domain returned NXDOMAIN for selector1 through its CNAME and a key for selector2 [10]. The checker does not flag the inactive selector of the pair while its partner has a key. Once you leave Microsoft 365, delete both.

An empty key is a different case. Fastmail’s own domain publishes its rotated-out selectors with p= empty and a note in n= [10], which is a revoked key [1].

To fix a dangling CNAME, delete it if the service is gone. If you still use the provider, check its dashboard first: it may expect both records.

Mistakes to avoid

  • Deleting the new provider’s records because the names look alike. s1, fm1 and selector1 all look generic. Check where each one points before you delete it.
  • Removing the old key before the new provider signs. In the gap, your mail has no aligned DKIM. Under p=reject, forwarded mail then fails, because forwarding breaks SPF [3].
  • Deleting one selector of a Microsoft 365 pair while you still use it. The inactive selector becomes the active one at the next key rotation [5].
  • Counting on a wildcard to cover old selectors. A *._domainkey record with an empty key does not apply to names that exist, so the old selectors keep their keys [2].
  • Choosing 1024 bits at the new provider. RFC 8301 says signers should use keys of at least 2048 bits [11]. Pick 2048 when the provider offers it.

Check which DKIM selectors your domain still publishes

The checker tries the selectors of common providers, plus any you type in, and shows which ones still return a key, which are revoked and which point nowhere.

Check your published DKIM selectors

Runs in your browser. Your domain is not sent to this site or stored.

See it on a test domain

Check these names under badmail.dev to see this in a result, without checking your own domain.

All the test domains

Sources

  1. 1RFC 6376, DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM) Signatures. Sections 3.1, 3.5, 3.6.1, 3.6.2.1 and 6.1.2rfc-editor.org, IETF. Checked .
  2. 2RFC 1034, Domain Names: Concepts and Facilities. Sections 3.6.2 and 4.3.3rfc-editor.org, IETF. Checked .
  3. 3RFC 9989, Domain-Based Message Authentication, Reporting, and Conformance (DMARC). Sections 4.4.1 and 7.4rfc-editor.org, IETF. Checked .
  4. 4RFC 9990, Domain-Based Message Authentication, Reporting, and Conformance (DMARC) Aggregate Reporting. Section 3.1.1.12 and Appendix Crfc-editor.org, IETF. Checked .
  5. 5Set up DKIM to sign mail from your cloud domainlearn.microsoft.com, Microsoft. Checked .
  6. 6Manual DNS configurationfastmail.help, Fastmail. Checked .
  7. 7Set up DKIMknowledge.workspace.google.com, Google. Checked .
  8. 8Configure domain authenticationtwilio.com, Twilio SendGrid. Checked .
  9. 9Domain configuration (Email Routing DNS records)developers.cloudflare.com, Cloudflare. Checked .
  10. 10Measurement: dig 9.10.6 against 1.1.1.1, TXT queries for selector1 and selector2 under _domainkey.microsoft.com and fm1, fm2 and fm3 under _domainkey.fastmail.com, 5 queries, 18 November 2026 at 11:57 CETrfc-editor.org, Measurement. Checked .
  11. 11RFC 8301, Cryptographic Algorithm and Key Usage Update to DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM). Section 3.2rfc-editor.org, IETF. Checked .