How to read a DMARC aggregate report, line by line
Once your DMARC record has a rua tag, receivers that send reports mail you a compressed XML file, usually once a day [1][2]. Each file lists the IP addresses that sent mail with your domain in the From line, how many messages came from each, and whether they passed.
The short answer
A DMARC aggregate report is an XML file, usually gzip-compressed, that one receiver sends about one domain, typically for one UTC day [1]. Each record gives a sending IP address, a message count, the disposition applied, the aligned DKIM and SPF results, and the raw results with their domains and the DKIM selector [1].
What arrives in your mailbox
An aggregate report comes as an email with the report attached, as application/gzip (a .xml.gz file) or as text/xml (a .xml file) [1]. The file name follows a fixed pattern: the receiver, your domain, and the start and end of the period in Unix time [1].
mail.receiver.example!example.com!1794873600!1794959999.xml.gz
The subject line has a fixed pattern too [1]:
Subject: Report Domain: example.com Submitter: mail.receiver.example Report-ID: <1794873600-example.com@mail.receiver.example>
RFC 9989 asks receivers to send reports at least once every 24 hours [2], and a report typically covers one UTC day starting at 00:00 [1]. Not every receiver sends them. RFC 9989 names resource limits, local policy and user privacy as the usual reasons to opt out [2].
No reports at all? Check the rua tag
Receivers must not send aggregate reports unless your DMARC record has a rua tag [2]:
_dmarc.example.com. TXT "v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:dmarc-reports@example.com"
You can list several addresses separated by commas, and receivers should send a report to each one [2]. If an address is on another domain, read Sending reports to another domain first.
A report, field by field
This report covers 17 November 2026 for example.com, which publishes p=none. It has four rows. Here is the start of the file and the first row; the file validates against the schema in RFC 9990 [3].
<feedback xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:dmarc-2.0">
<version>1.0</version>
<report_metadata>
<org_name>mail.receiver.example</org_name>
<email>dmarc-noreply@mail.receiver.example</email>
<report_id>1794873600-example.com@mail.receiver.example</report_id>
<date_range>
<begin>1794873600</begin>
<end>1794959999</end>
</date_range>
</report_metadata>
<policy_published>
<domain>example.com</domain>
<p>none</p>
<testing>n</testing>
<discovery_method>treewalk</discovery_method>
</policy_published>
<record>
<row>
<source_ip>192.0.2.10</source_ip>
<count>412</count>
<policy_evaluated>
<disposition>none</disposition>
<dkim>pass</dkim>
<spf>pass</spf>
</policy_evaluated>
</row>
<identifiers>
<header_from>example.com</header_from>
<envelope_from>example.com</envelope_from>
</identifiers>
<auth_results>
<dkim>
<domain>example.com</domain>
<selector>mail2026</selector>
<result>pass</result>
</dkim>
<spf>
<domain>example.com</domain>
<scope>mfrom</scope>
<result>pass</result>
</spf>
</auth_results>
</record>
report_metadata: who sent it and for which day
| Field | What it holds |
|---|---|
org_ |
The receiver that wrote the report [1]. |
email |
A contact address at that receiver [1]. |
report_ |
A unique ID. A resent report keeps the same one [1]. |
date_ |
begin and end in seconds since 1 January 1970, UTC [1]. 1794873600 is 17 November 2026, 00:00 UTC; on macOS, date -u -r 1794873600 prints it. |
policy_published: the record the receiver found
domain, p, sp, np and testing (your t tag) show the policy the receiver applied. Most of these fields are optional; when one appears for a tag you did not publish, it holds that tag’s default value [1]. discovery_method says how the receiver found the record: treewalk under RFC 9989, psl under the older RFC 7489 [1].
row: who sent and what happened
| Field | What it holds |
|---|---|
source_ |
The IP address that connected to the receiver [1]. |
count |
How many messages from that address got this result [1]. |
disposition |
What the receiver did: none, pass, quarantine or reject [1]. |
dkim, spf |
The DMARC results: pass only if that method passed and its domain aligns with your From domain [1]. |
reason |
Present when the receiver did something other than your policy asked [1]. |
identifiers and auth_results: the raw results
header_from is the From domain, and envelope_from is the domain SPF checked, the envelope sender [1]. auth_results holds the SPF and DKIM results before any DMARC logic: for DKIM, the signing domain (d=), the selector (s=) and the result; for SPF, the domain and the result [1]. RFC 9990 made the selector required [1], so the reports tell you which DKIM key signed each row.
Read the two blocks together. A DKIM signature can pass in auth_results for example.net while policy_evaluated says dkim failed: the signature is valid, but its domain does not align with your From domain [1][2].
Sort each row into one of four cases
These are the four rows of the sample report.
| Row | policy_evaluated |
auth_results |
Most likely | What to do |
|---|---|---|---|---|
192., 412 messages |
dkim pass, spf pass |
DKIM pass for example.com, SPF pass for example.com |
Your own mail, set up correctly | Nothing |
198., 37 messages |
dkim fail, spf fail |
DKIM pass for example.net, SPF pass for bounces.example.net |
A service you use, signing with its own domain | Set up DKIM with your domain at that service |
203., 3 messages |
dkim pass, spf fail |
DKIM pass for example.com, SPF softfail |
Your mail, resent by a forwarder from its own server | Nothing: aligned DKIM carried it through |
203., 58 messages |
dkim fail, spf fail |
No DKIM signature, SPF softfail for example.com |
Spoofing: someone else using your domain | Nothing to fix on your side. quarantine and reject exist for this mail |
A report can’t prove who sent a message, so each row is a lead to check. To see who owns an address, look up its reverse DNS name with dig -x 198.51.100.25 +short and compare it with the services you pay for.
Forwarding shows up as an SPF failure with DKIM intact, because the forwarder sends from its own IP address and the signature survives the trip [2]. Mail that passes through a mailing list can fail both; a receiver that recognizes it may add a reason [1].
Override reasons
reason holds one of these types when a receiver applies something other than your policy [1]:
| Type | Meaning |
|---|---|
local_ |
The receiver’s own policy exempted the message. |
mailing_ |
The receiver decided the message came through a mailing list. |
trusted_ |
The message came through a forwarder the receiver trusts. |
policy_ |
Your t=y tag kept the receiver from applying the policy. |
other |
Anything else, explained in comment. |
Sending reports to another domain
A rua address outside your organizational domain needs that domain’s consent. Before it sends, the receiver looks up a TXT record built from your domain, _report._dmarc and the host of the address. If no record there starts with v=DMARC1, it must ignore the address [1].
For rua=mailto:dmarc@reports.example.net on example.com, the owner of reports.example.net publishes:
example.com._report._dmarc.reports.example.net. TXT "v=DMARC1"
A report service that accepts reports for any domain can publish a wildcard instead, such as *._report._dmarc.reports.example.net [1]. Where you can, RFC 9989 suggests a simpler route: receive the reports at an address on your own domain and forward them [2].
Failure reports follow the same rule: a ruf address outside your organizational domain needs the same record, or receivers must not send to it [4].
Handle report files with care
- Compressed XML from strangers can be hostile. RFC 9990 warns that the decompressor and the XML parser are targets for zip bombs and XML bombs [1]. Open reports with a tool that limits sizes and does not expand XML entities.
- Reports can be forged. Anyone can mail you a file that looks like a report [1]. A real report email has to pass DMARC itself with an aligned result [1], so check that before you trust its contents.
- Keep the mailbox private. Reports contain no personal data such as individual addresses or message content [1], but for a small organization they can still reveal sending patterns, so the address needs access controls [2].
By hand or with a tool
RFC 9989 recommends parsing reports by machine [2], and RFC 9990 notes that the XML is not human readable in bulk [1]. One report opens in a text editor after gunzip. A few dozen a day need a parser or a report service. Either way, it reads the fields above.
Mistakes to avoid
- Deleting
ruabecause the reports pile up. Send them to a dedicated mailbox or a parser instead. Without reports, you can’t tell which services would fail underp=reject[2]. From p=none to p=reject shows how to use them for each step. - Reading
auth_resultsas the DMARC result. A DKIM or SPF pass there may belong to another domain. The DMARC answer is inpolicy_evaluated[1]. - Treating every failing row as an attack. Your own unaligned services and forwarded mail fail too. Check the IP address before you decide.
- Pointing
ruaat another domain without its record. Receivers drop the address and you get nothing [1]. - Expecting a report from every receiver. Sending them is a recommendation, and some receivers opt out [2].
- Ignoring the selector. An old selector that still appears with a DKIM pass means something still signs with a key you thought was retired. See DKIM records still pointing at your old provider.
Check your DMARC reporting address
The DMARC checker reads your rua tag, flags a record that asks for no reports, and checks that an address on another domain has the record that accepts them. The DMARC record page explains the other tags.
Runs in your browser. Your domain is not sent to this site or stored.
See it on a test domain
Check these names under badmail.dev to see this in a result, without checking your own domain.
dmarc-rua-ext.badmail.dev: check it or see its recordsdmarc-ruf.badmail.dev: check it or see its records
Related guides
From DMARC p=none to p=reject without blocking your own mail
Move DMARC from p=none to quarantine and then reject without losing real mail. What to fix first, how long to wait, and how t=y, pct and subdomains behave.
DKIM records still pointing at your old provider: what to keep and what to remove
Old DKIM keys keep validating mail signed for your domain. Find the selectors an old provider left, remove or revoke them safely, and fix dangling CNAMEs.
