p=none asks receivers to change nothing about mail that fails DMARC [1]. Anyone can still send email as your domain. Switching straight to p=reject asks receivers to refuse their mail, and also the mail of every legitimate service you forgot to set up.

The short answer

First make every service that sends as your domain pass DMARC through aligned DKIM, and aligned SPF where it can. RFC 9989 requires every legitimate sender to pass before enforcement, and DKIM before p=reject [1]. Then publish p=none with a rua address, read the aggregate reports, move to p=quarantine, and then to p=reject, checking the reports at each step.

Why p=none leaves your domain open

RFC 9989 is explicit: a DMARC policy of p=none must not modify how receivers handle mail [1]. It exists so you can collect aggregate reports while nothing changes. A forged message from your domain is delivered or filtered as if you had no DMARC record, and the checker reports your domain as open to spoofing: “Anyone can send email as example.com.”

Gmail’s bulk sender rules accept p=none [5]. That meets Gmail’s rule and stops no forged mail.

What it looks like when you move too fast

Under p=reject, mail from a service you forgot fails DMARC and bounces. Gmail returns a message that starts like this, with your domain where its documentation shows domain-name [4]:

550 5.7.26 Unauthenticated email from domain-name is not accepted due to domain's DMARC policy. Contact the administrator of domain-name domain if this was legitimate email. …
Exact text from source [4]

Under p=quarantine, the same mail is accepted and kept out of the inbox at receivers that honor the policy [1], so nobody gets a bounce. Your aggregate reports show both cases: rows with the IP address of your own service and a disposition of quarantine or reject [2]. How to read a DMARC aggregate report shows where to look.

Before you change p: make every sender pass

  1. List every service that sends with your domain in the From line. Your mailbox provider, newsletters, billing, CRM, help desk, website forms, scanners. RFC 9989 warns that it is easy to overlook a server or a third-party sender, which is why it starts with reports [1].
  2. Set up DKIM with your domain at each one. The signature’s domain (d=) has to be example.com or a subdomain of it [1]. DKIM matters most at the end: RFC 9989 says a domain that publishes p=reject must not rely on SPF alone and must sign with DKIM, because forwarding breaks SPF and usually leaves DKIM signatures valid [1].
  3. Give the service a Return-Path on your domain where it offers one. Then SPF passes for the envelope sender’s domain, which aligns with your From domain under relaxed alignment [1]. Too many DNS lookups shows how bulk senders do this on a subdomain.

Alignment is relaxed by default, so a signature from mail.example.com aligns with a From address at example.com [1].

A domain that sends no email has no senders to break and can publish p=reject today. Lock down a domain that sends no email gives the full set of records.

Step 1: p=none with reports

_dmarc.example.com.  TXT  "v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:dmarc-reports@example.com"

The rua address receives the reports. Read them until every row from your own services shows an aligned pass. How long that takes depends on how often each service sends: RFC 9989 warns it can take many months of reports [1], and a service that sends monthly invoices needs at least a full month to appear.

Step 2: p=quarantine

_dmarc.example.com.  TXT  "v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; rua=mailto:dmarc-reports@example.com"

Mail that fails DMARC now stays out of the inbox at receivers that honor the policy [1]. Watch the reports for rows from your own IP addresses with a disposition of quarantine.

If people at your domain post to mailing lists, RFC 9989 asks you to spend at least a month at p=none and as long again at p=quarantine before p=reject, comparing the results [1].

Testing mode with t=y

RFC 9989 adds the t tag. With t=y, receivers apply one level below the policy you publish: p=quarantine; t=y behaves like p=none, and p=reject; t=y like p=quarantine [1].

Receivers that still run RFC 7489 do not know the tag, and that RFC tells them to ignore unknown tags [3]. For them, p=quarantine; t=y is plain quarantine. What they read instead is pct=0, which gives the same one-level drop under RFC 7489 [1][3]. To test at the lower level everywhere, publish both:

_dmarc.example.com.  TXT  "v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; t=y; pct=0; rua=mailto:dmarc-reports@example.com"

The checker counts t=y or pct=0 one level down. Remove both tags when you leave testing.

Step 3: p=reject

_dmarc.example.com.  TXT  "v=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:dmarc-reports@example.com"

Publish it once DKIM covers all your own mail. Keep the rua tag: reports are how you see a service you add later failing DMARC.

Two notes from RFC 9989 [1]:

  • It says domains whose users post to mailing lists should not publish p=reject. It also records that mailing list software has adopted workarounds that rewrite the From line so list mail stays aligned.
  • Receivers keep the final say. A receiver with no other evidence about a failing message must treat it as quarantine instead of rejecting it.

Subdomains: sp and np

A subdomain without a DMARC record of its own takes its policy from the record of your organizational domain: sp if the subdomain exists, np if it does not, and p when those tags are missing [1]. Receivers still on RFC 7489 ignore np as an unknown tag and apply sp or p [3]. The step 3 record therefore covers news.example.com, and invented names such as billing-secure.example.com, with reject.

A leftover sp=none keeps every subdomain open, and the checker reports the domain as partly protected. If one subdomain needs more time, give it its own record and leave the rest at reject:

_dmarc.example.com.       TXT  "v=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:dmarc-reports@example.com"
_dmarc.news.example.com.  TXT  "v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:dmarc-reports@example.com"

A receiver that finds a record at the subdomain’s own _dmarc name uses that record’s p [1].

What happened to pct

RFC 7489 had a pct tag that applied the policy to a percentage of failing mail. RFC 9989 removed it, because receivers applied values other than 0 and 100 inconsistently, and replaced pct=0 with t=y [1].

Receivers built on RFC 7489 still read it. Mail outside the percentage gets one level less: with p=reject; pct=50, the other half is treated as quarantine, and with p=quarantine; pct=50, the other half gets normal handling [3]. The checker reads it the same way. Below 100, it counts quarantine as none and reject as quarantine, and pct=0 counts like t=y. Use pct=0 only next to t=y while you test, as in step 2, and leave out the values between 1 and 99. The DMARC record page lists every tag RFC 9989 keeps.

Mistakes to avoid

  • Reaching p=reject with SPF as the only pass. Forwarders resend your mail from their own servers, so SPF fails and only DKIM survives. RFC 9989 requires DKIM on domains that publish reject [1].
  • Turning on strict alignment without checking. adkim=s and aspf=s need the exact From domain. A service that signs as mail.example.com passes relaxed alignment and fails strict [1].
  • Sending reports to another domain without its consent. An address outside your organizational domain works only if that domain publishes a record that accepts your reports; otherwise receivers must ignore it [2]. See Sending reports to another domain.
  • Publishing a second record for the new policy. Two records at _dmarc.example.com cancel each other: receivers discard both and act as if you had no DMARC [1].
  • Leaving sp=none from the test phase. Your main domain is protected and every subdomain stays open.
  • Keeping pct after testing. RFC 9989 dropped pct from its tags and lists it as historic, so receivers built on it are not expected to apply it, while RFC 7489 receivers still do [1][3]. A leftover pct below 100 keeps those receivers one level below your policy for some or all failing mail.

Check your DMARC policy

The DMARC checker reads your record the way a receiver does, including sp, np, t and pct, and tells you which step you are on.

Check your DMARC policy

Runs in your browser. Your domain is not sent to this site or stored.

See it on a test domain

Check these names under badmail.dev to see this in a result, without checking your own domain.

All the test domains

Sources

  1. 1RFC 9989, Domain-Based Message Authentication, Reporting, and Conformance (DMARC). Sections 3.2.9, 3.2.10, 4.4, 4.7, 4.10, 4.10.1, 5.1, 5.4, 7.4, 9.3, A.6 and C.5rfc-editor.org, IETF. Checked .
  2. 2RFC 9990, Domain-Based Message Authentication, Reporting, and Conformance (DMARC) Aggregate Reporting. Sections 3.1.1.9 and 4rfc-editor.org, IETF. Checked .
  3. 3RFC 7489, Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting, and Conformance (DMARC) (2015, obsoleted by RFC 9989, RFC 9990 and RFC 9991 in May 2026). Sections 6.3 and 6.6.4rfc-editor.org, IETF. Checked .
  4. 4Gmail SMTP errors and codesknowledge.workspace.google.com, Google. Checked .
  5. 5Email sender guidelinessupport.google.com, Google. Checked .